

TAB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director/OPR

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Could we discuss the attached in
my office Monday morning (16 December)
at 9:00?

Paul V. Walsh
ADDI

cc: DD/OSR

12 Dec 1974
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/COR

[]

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at 9:00?

Paul V. Walsh
ADDI


cc: Director/OPR

12 Dec 1974
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, FBIS



Per our telephone conversation.

Paul V. Walsh
ADDI

Attachment


3 Jan 1975

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul

Please get 
together and determine
which should take
the lead on this -- find
out about impact etc

Ed

11 Dec
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Proctor, Walsh

Attached is an ISA request, through Stoertz, for a reaction piece on the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of May 72 and the Vladivostok meeting. It's a tall order.

What action?

Parenthetically, it seems to me that this request, together with what seems to be an increasing number of requests that we line up reps for NIO meetings, points to the need for some sort of DDI clearing house. With a few adjustments in duties, the Executive Staff could act as schedulers and record keepers, but we could not deal with substance and we might find ourselves swamped if all NIOs began 10 December 1974 using us as a channel for (DATE) all intra-DDI business.

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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SECRET

NIO # 2714-74

DDI-2544-74

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director

SP - 166/74
6 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIO/SP Request for Intelligence Reports

1. This memorandum contains a request from one of our customers which gives rise to a recommendation of my own. Mr. Charles Sorrels of ISA/Policy Planning, acting on behalf of Dr. James Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), has asked for an intelligence study containing, inter alia, an in-depth analysis of the reaction in certain countries to the Nixon-Brezhnev summit of May, 1972, and to the recent Ford-Brezhnev meeting at Vladivostok as they have affected perceptions of the US-Soviet strategic balance (see the attached outline provided by ISA). It is my understanding that CIA has not produced or scheduled any study of this question beyond what is normally done with reactions gathered by FBIS. It seems to me that such a project would have potential utility for ISA and other customers. It would require the inclusion of information received through channels other than FBIS, e.g., diplomatic channels. Thus it would involve the participation of OCI, and perhaps OPR, in addition to FBIS. Mr. Sorrels is available to discuss in detail the approach, scope, and timing of the inquiry ISA is requesting.

2. Mr. Sorrels' request serves to remind me of a broader problem which confronts the Intelligence Community, having to do with perceptions of strategic power and the strategic balance by the Soviets and others in the coming months and years. The importance of this problem is made clear in NIE 11-3/8, which maintains that the political impact of future Soviet forces will depend largely on how they are perceived by the Soviets, the US, and other nations. Further, the Estimate says that in

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SP - 166/74

SUBJECT: NIO/SP Request for Intelligence Reports

a crisis, views about the capabilities and resolve of both sides will be affected by perceptions of strategic forces.

3. The Community's attention also has been drawn to this problem, in part, through a Key Intelligence Question (KIQ 6) which asks about Soviet perceptions relating to strategic weapons and the strategic balance. The draft strategy report for this KIQ outlines certain measures to be taken in addressing it. My concern is that CIA ought to figure importantly in this and related efforts. Specifically, I recommend that some DDI analytical resources (e.g., those in FBIS, CRS, OCI, and OPR) be focused on the problem of the perception of the US-Soviet strategic balance by the NATO countries and other key countries of Europe and Asia. I assume that OSR/SEC could also contribute, but believe that their resources are already heavily committed to Soviet perceptions and other related matters.

4. The publication by CIA of intelligence analyses on this subject, as data and conclusions are developed over time, could be of considerable value to US policy officials. The results of such an effort should put the US in an improved position to make decisions in the future dealing with the important question of the political sufficiency of its strategic forces.



Howard Stoertz, WFO
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

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Attachment
Outline

cc: D/DCI/NIO

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OUTLINE

Study of Perceptions of the Strategic
Balance Expressed in Other Nations, 1972 & 1974

Time Frame

The study will initially concentrate on the time periods of 2-3 months before and after the SALT I Moscow Summit in May, 1972 and the Vladivostok Summit in November, 1974. In its second phase, the study should cover the 1972-1974 period, to provide a firmer basis for establishing trends in the perceptions, and the factors which stimulate and shape statements of perceptions of the current and expected state of the strategic balance.

Countries covered

The nations included in the study would be West Germany, France, UK, (perhaps one country among Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), Japan, PRC, and perhaps Israel and Egypt.

Sources: The stated perceptions by political elites and general public noted and analyzed would be drawn from opinion surveys, major media, government, and other institutional sources such as the IISS in London. Media in West Germany, for example would include Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Spiegel (e.g., an interview with the Foreign Minister). Government statements would include formal documents (such as West German Annual Defense Report or British White Paper) and statements by major leaders, publicly and privately, to US officials reported through State Department and other cables.

Purpose

The principal purpose of the study is to provide some detailed factual basis for discussion and analysis of the nature and trends in the perceptions of foreign political elites and general publics of the current state (1972-1974) and expected trends in strategic balance.

The study should determine what aspects of the strategic balance are important as bases for perceptions of the strategic balance. Specifically, it should identify factors (such as static measures) or events which prompt and shape statements of perceptions of the strategic balance, such as the Summits in May, 1972 and Nov, 1974, demonstrations of technology and force capability such as Soviet MIRV tests, C5A drop of MINUTEMAN and resupply to Israel, declaratory policy such as Posture Statement and budgetary actions such as Congressional approval of FY 1975 strategic R&D initiatives.

The study should include the implications explicitly and implicitly drawn by the foreign observers of the state and trends in the strategic balance for the credibility of US deterrent posture, for desired relations with the US, for their own nation's defenses and behavior, and for Soviet propensity to take risks and press for advantage.